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Insurance Subrogation in Personal Injury Torts
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Smith v.
Travelers Insurance Co.' sustained the validity of subrogation provisions
for medical payments in an automobile insurance policy. The result is a
significant expansion of subrogation in the area of personal injury tort
claims. Subrogation provisions similar to the one litigated in Smith have
been upheld in a large majority of the other states that have considered the
issue.2 Because automobile insurance is carried by the average motorist,
because other accident and health insurance is increasingly common, and
because accidents involving personal injury often precipitate lawsuits or
threatened lawsuits, the attorney is likely to have occasion to consider the
effects of insurance subrogation.
This Note will offer aid to those who are faced with a personal injury
subrogation issue by explaining some basic aspects of insurance subroga-
tion that are often only alluded to in court opinions, and by discussing
points of particular concern in cases involving subrogation to personal
injury tort claims. These points of concern include the effect of subroga-
tion on important rules of tort litigation, requirements for joinder of the
insurer, and some general policy issues.
I. THE FACTS AND HOLDING IN Smith v. Travelers Insurance Co.
The facts and rationale presented by the court in the brief Smith
opinion can be stated concisely. The insured, Mrs. Smith, brought suit
against her automobile insurer, Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers),
after Travelers refused to pay Mrs. Smith for medical expenses incurred as
a result of an automobile accident in which the driver of the other vehicle
was allegedly at fault. Mrs. Smith had entered into a settlement with the
alleged tortfeasor and his insurer. As part of this settlement she signed a
release. Travelers maintained that its rights of subrogation to the
1. 50 Ohio St. 2d 43,362 N.E.2d 264(1977).
2. See, e.g., Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 48 Ala. App. 172.263 So. 2d
149, afi'd, 263 So. 2d 155 (Ala. 1972); Shipley v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co.. 244 Ark. 1159. 428
S.W.2d 268 (1968); Higgins v. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 471 (D.C. App. 1968);
DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), afftd. 202 So. 2d 561 (Fla.
1967); Rinehart v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 115, 524 P.2d 1343 (1974); Damhesel v.
Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 60 III. App. 2d 279, 209 N.E.2d 876 (1965); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roark, 517 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1974); Travelers Indem. Co.v. Vaecari,245 N.W.2d 844
(Minn. 1976); Busch v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54,234 A.2d 250 (1967); Jacobson v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 N.M. 280,491 P.2d 168 (1971); Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
81 Nev. 361,404 P.2d 10(1965); Carverv. Mills, 22 N.C. App. 745,207 S.E.2d 394 (1974); Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Associates Transports, Inc., 512 P.2d 137 (Okla. 1973); Geertzv. State Farm Fire&Cas.
Co. 253 Or. 307,451 P.2d 860 (1969); Bradford v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 8,
245 A.2d 478 (1968); Schuldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 270 (S.D. 1975); Wilson
v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Tenn. 560,411 S.W.2d 699 (1966); Foundation Reserve Ins.
Co. v. Cody, 458 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sessions, 22 Utah2d
183,450 P.2d458 (1969); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,4 Wash. App.49.
480 P.2d 226 (1971); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Rader, 152 W. Va. 699, 166 S.E.2d 157 (1969).
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insured's claim against the alleged tortfeasor for medical payments had
been prejudiced by Mrs. Smith. This settlement was contrary to both the
policy's subrogation provision to do nothing to prejudice such rights and a
separate subrogation agreement executed after the accident pursuant to
the policy.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, using a "straightforward application of
contract principles, 3 held that the subrogation clause in the policy was a
valid defense for the insurer. Quoting a Tennessee decision,4 the court
stated that "[g]enerally, parties may contract as they wish and we cannot
see that it is against public policy for the parties to contract for subrogation
of medical payments." 5 Because the insurer had obtained legally enforce-
able rights by subrogation, and because the exercise of these rights had
been precluded by the terms of Mrs. Smith's settlement with the tortfeasor,
the insurer had suffered prejudice that would excuse it from the necessity of
paying under the policy. The court, again quoting the Tennessee decision,
noted that, "To hold otherwise would permit an injured plaintiff to recover
twice [once from the tortfeasor and once from the insurer] for the same
medical expenses." 6
II. BASIC ANALYSIS OF SUBROGATION
A. Definition and Purposes of Subrogation
Subrogation, as the term is used in this Note, is a legal doctrine by
which the insurer is substituted to the rights of the insured for the purpose
of claiming reimbursement from a third person for the loss indemnified by
the insurance. Subrogation in insurance law thus serves two purposes.
It prevents the insured from receiving a double recovery by requiring the
insured to choose between seeking recovery either from the tortfeasor, or
from the insurer in exchange for the claim against the tortfeasor, Subro-
gation also serves to reimburse the insurer from the one who ought to pay
for the loss, the tortfeasor.8  This latter purpose is related to the fault-
based general principle of tort law because it places the ultimate burden of
the loss on a culpable party.
The subrogated insurer can pursue the tortfeasor for payment of the
claim to which it is subrogated. Because the subrogee (the insurer),
3. 50 Ohio St. 2d 43,46,362 N.E.2d 264,266 (1977).
4. Wilson v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Tenn. 560,566,411 S.W.2d 699,702 (1966),
5. Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 Ohio St. 2d 43,46,362 N.E.2d 264,266 (1977).
6. Id. at 46-47, 362 N.E.2d at 266.
7. E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 148-49 (2d ed. 1957); W. VANCE, HANDIBOOK OF
TIlE LAW OF INSURANCE 787 (3d ed. B. Anderson 1951).
8. Shipley v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Ark., 1159, 428 S.W,2d 268 (1968); Lyon v.
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971) (emphasizing the role
subrogation plays in preventing double recoveries); G. Coucii, 16 Coucii CYCLOPEDIA OF INStIRANCE
LAW, 61:18 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1966) and cases cited therein.
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however, must base its claim upon the right of recovery held by the
subrogor (the insured), the tortfeasor can use a settlement and release
agreement with the insured as a defense to a suit by the insurer if the
tortfeasor entered into the settlement without knowledge of the insurer's
payment upon which the subrogation claim is asserted. The insurer thus
has its subrogation rights prejudiced because the settlement and release
precludes a successful suit by the insurer.
When suit against the tortfeasor has been precluded, however, the
insurer has a right to sue its insured for repayment of the insurance
recovery if the settlement was not assented to by the insurer. The cause of
action for such a suit against the insured can be based on several theories,
including constructive trust, implied promise, and deceit.9 When the
policy has an express provision, as many do, that the insured shall do
nothing after the loss to prejudice the subrogation rights of the insurer, it
would seem that the cause of action could be for a direct breach of
contract. Such a suit for reimbursement effectuates the purpose of
preventing the double recovery by the insured that would result if he were
permitted to keep both the insurance money and the settlement proceeds
covering the same injury.
B. The Needfor a Contract and Other Basic Requirements
1. The General Necessities of a Contract of
Indemnity and of Payment; Variations Introduced
by the "No Prejudice" Clause
Subrogation can be either legal or contractual in nature, and applies
when the underlying contract is one of indemnity.10 Because contracts for
life insurance, for example, are viewed as being in the nature of an
investment and not contracts of indemnity, subrogation does not apply to
them." An insurance contract qualifies as a contract of indemnity when
"the amount paid under the contract depends on the amount spent by the
insured for the proper care of his injuries."' 2 Since most modern insu-
rance policies covering personal injury, such as policies for medical
payments, limit coverage to the cost actually incurred in receiving appro-
9. W. YOUNG, LAW OF INSURANCE 365-66 (1971). See 6A J. APPLE.NtA, & J. APPLE.%iA,,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4096 (1972); R. KEEtON, BAsIc TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 159-60
(1971); E. PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 149; W. VANCE, supra note 7, at 786-87, 794. Somecourts
have held, however, that "after denial of liability byan insurer, the insured mayenter into a settlement
with a third party without prejudicing [his] rights against the insurer." Bunge Corp. v. London and
Overseas Ins. Co., 394 F.2d 496, 497, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968).
10. See DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224.226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
aff'd, 202 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1967); G. COUCH, supra note 8, § 61.8 and cases cited therein; E. PATrrEi-
SON, supra note 7, at 148. For a discussion of the distinction between legal and contractual
subrogation, see text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
11. G. CoUCH,supra note 10, § 61:8; E. PATTERsoN,supra note 7, at 148, W. VANCEsupra notc7,
at 797.
12. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Sessions, 22 Utah 2d 183,450 P.2d 458,
459(1969).
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priate treatment (for example, they do not "guarantee" $500 in payment
even when actual expenses are less), these contracts are typically contracts
of indemnity.
Even if there is a clear provision for subrogation in a contract that is
obviously one of indemnity, there can be no subrogation until payment for
the loss is actually made by the insurer, at least when the insurer is a
plaintiff seeking its subrogation rights.1 3  The insurer (subrogee) as
plaintiff thus does not have a cause of action for reimbursement from the
insured and the insurer cannot sue the tortfeasor directly until it has
actually disbursed funds in payment for the risk covered by the policy.
When the insured is the party at fault in an accident, however, so that
the insurance payment represents liability expenses (that is, payment for
injury to the other person or damage to the other's property), the insurer as
plaintiff has no subrogation suit. Subrogation is only possible when there
is a third party tortfeasor, since under subrogation theory the insurer bases
his claim upon the right of recovery held by the subrogor (the insured). The
insured has no right of recovery against himself or against the other party
when he is the one at fault in an accident. Moreover, the liability payment
by the insurer represents the very expense that it has contractually agreed
to bear.
When the insurer is a defendant, however, in an action brought by the
insured seeking recovery under the policy, it has an effective defense to the
suit if the insured has prejudiced its subrogation rights against a third party
tortfeasor although no payment has yet been made. Arguments by
counsel for the insured that the defending insurer has waived the subroga-
tion clause by not making any payments 14 misconstrue the applicable
language in the typical subrogation provision that constitutes the basis of
the defense for the insurer. Some courts properly have made it clear that
when the subrogation provision is being used as a shield, it is the "no
prejudice" clause that is the basis of the insurer's defense.' 3 This clause
usually follows the subrogation clause and states that "[t]he in-
sured . .. shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such [subrogation]
rights."'6  If the insured has prejudiced the rights of the insurer (for
example, by engaging in a settlement with the tortfeasor that precludes a
iawsuit by the insurer), the insurer is properly excused from payment 7 and
13. See J. APPLENIAN, I 1 INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 6509 (1944); G. CouCl, supra note
10, § 61:46; E. PATTERSON, supra note 7, it 148-49; W. VANCE, supra note 7, at 790,
14. See Bradford v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 8, 245 A.2d 478 (1968);
Hart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 N.W.2d 881 (S.D. 1976), Both courts rejected this
argument in cases in which subrogation was being used as a defense by the insurer,
15. See, e.g., DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 226, (Fla, Dist. Ct, App.
1966), aff'd, 202 So. 2d 561 (1967).
16. Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 Ohio St. 2d 43,43-44,362 N.E 2d 264.265 (1977) (quoting the
"no prejudice" clause in Mrs. Smith's insurance policy with Traveler:).
17. E.g., cases cited in note 14 supra. See also Shipley v. Northwestern Mut, Ins. Co., 244 Ark.
1159, 1162, 428 S.W.2d 268, 270 (1968); Higgins v. Allied Am. Mut. vire ins. Co.,237 A.2d471,471
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thus should not be liable to an insured who sues it for payment under a
breach of contract theory.
Even with the absence of a no prejudice clause, it is doubtful that an
insured can recover under the insurance policy after he promises subroga-
tion rights to his insurer and then makes a settlement with the tortfeasor
that precludes the exercise of these rights.'8 In the interests of good faith
bargaining, the insured's promise of subrogation rights to the insurer
ought to carry with it a promise not to prejudice these rights, although it is
possible to draw a technical and somewhat attenuated distinction between
promising subrogation and promising to limit a possible settlement with
the tortfeasor so as not to preclude the insurer's claim. t9 The insurer,
however, that makes payment and then has its subrogation rights
prejudiced by the insured's settlement with the tortfeasor can seek
repayment of the insurance recovery2 and courts may thus see little
reason, barring bad faith dealing by the insurer, in allowing the insured to
receive the insurance recovery when he simply acts to prejudice
subrogation rights before the insurer pays.
The cases that recognize the insured's prejudicial settlement with the
tortfeasor as an effective defense to an action against the insurer for breach
of contract rest upon a threshold finding that the subrogation provision in
question is valid, at least to the extent that it prevents a double recovery by
the insured. In jurisdictions that have denied subrogation for personal
injury tort claims, such as medical payments,2 the insurer cannot claim to
have any rights prejudiced since no enforceable right exists. The tradi-
tional result under the collateral sources rule,22 which allows the insured to
recover from both his insurer and the tortfeasor, should apply since there is
no legal basis to excuse the insurer from his obligation to pay, unless a
policy provision unrelated to subrogation releases the insurer from that
obligation.
2. Legal and Contractual Subrogation Distinguished
Although subrogation had its origin in equity,23 today a distinction is
(D.C. App. 1968), DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224,225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App..
1966), aff'd, 202 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1967).
18. See Foundation-Reserve Ins. Co. v. Cody, 458 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
Although the contract at issue had a "no prejudice" clause in it, the court apparently did not base its
opinion on the presence of this clause.
19. One might argue that by promising subrogation the insured merely agrees to let the insurer
stand in his place for the subrogation claim provided the insurer acts on the claim before settlement
between the insured and the tortfeasor is reached.
20. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
21. Subrogation to medical expense claims has been declared invalid in Arizona and Missouri.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Knapp, 107 Ariz. 184,484 P.2d 180 (1971);Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1965).
22. See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
23. W. VANCE, supra note 7, at 787-88.
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made between legal (equitable) and contractual (conventional) subroga-
tion. Legal subrogation arises by operation of law and is rooted in the
totality of the circumstances involved; under some circumstances justice is
thought to be better served by substituting the one who has actually paid to
the rights that another has against a third party. Contractual subroga-
tion, however, is based on an express provision between the parties by
which the subrogor agrees to let the subrogee stand in his place.
24
Insurance contracts are almost always written in detail and subrogation
provisions expressly set forth; thus, contractual subrogation is common in
modern insurance practice.
The assertion is sometimes made that there is little practical effect in
distinguishing between legal and contractual subrogation because the
same facts that entitle the insurer to claim subrogation under the contrac-
tual provisions would also create legal subrogation.25 Yet in Michigan
Hospital Service v. Sharpe2 6 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
payments by Michigan Hospital Service (Blue Cross) to its injured
subscriber merely constituted satisfaction of a contractual obligation that
arose because of the occurrence of a risk that the Service had agreed to
cover, and that 4bsent an express provision in the policy there was no
compelling reason to allow the additional right of legal subrogation.
27
The position taken in Sharpe is buttressed by insurance law authority
which states that if there is a contract, the rights of the parties will be
determined by that instrument and the equities will not be allowed to
expand or defeat subrogation rights.28
Cases such as Sharpe, which would limit the underwriter's subroga-
tion rights to those that are expressly in the written.contract, state the
better rule. Insurers draft the policies that they sell, and thus should be
limited to the terms of their own contracts. An insurer that wants the
protection of subrogation rights has abundant power to add appropriate
provisions. There is little necessity for allowing the insurer, the party in the
superior bargaining position, to gain an additional advantage by virtue of
judicial interpretation.
3. Varying Results Obtained Because of the Wording
of the Subrogation Provision
Provisions styled as subrogation provisions have not always been
24. G. CoucH, supra note 10, § 61:2; J. APPLCMAN, supra note 13, § 6503.
25. Id.
26. 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954).
27. The Michigan Hospital Service apparently did not qualify as an "insurance company" under
local law at that time, although it was clearly in the role of an insurer. See 339 Mich. 357, 361, 63
N.W.2d 638,640(1954). Contrast Michigan Medical Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574,64 N.W,2d 713
(1954) (in which subrogation was allowed when there was an expres,, clause in the policy claiming
this right).
28. See G. Coucu, supra note 10, § 61:3 and cases cited therein; J. APPLENIAN, supra note 13, §
6503 and cases cited therein.
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interpreted thus when litigated.29 The wording of subrogation provisions
varies significantly, as one sees by examining two typical subrogation pro-
visions contained in automobile insurance policies. When the applicable
language provides that "[i]n the event of any payment under this policy,
the company shall be subrogated to all the insured's rights of recovery
therefor against any person or organization . . . . the wording itself
will not unduly encumber subrogation. The insurer could exercise its
right of subrogation to the fullest extent allowed by the law of the
jurisdiction, including suit directly against the tortfeasor.3t
Courts have split, however, in interpreting subrogation clauses that
essentially provide that "[u]pon payment . . . the company shall be
subrogated to the extent of such payment to the proceeds ofany settlement
or judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of recovery
which the injured person . . . may have against any person or organiza-
tion . . 2 The Oregon Supreme Court has held that this language only
entitles the insurer to an interest in any money recovered in settlement after
the funds become the property of the insured, and does not entitle the
insurer to sue the tortfeasor directly.33 A recent Alabama case,34 in dicta,
interpreted a similar clause and indicated that it accepted this limiting
construction of the language, although it did not cite the Oregon decision.
Nevertheless, in Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,
35
the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the insurer to sue the tortfeasor
directly, given an identical subrogation clause. It is not clear, however,
whether the majority in Davenport held that the language of the clause
entitled the insurer to sue the tortfeasor, or that equity would recognize the
existence of a right to proceed against the tortfeasor in spite of that lan-
36guage.
29. See, e.g., Harris v. Huval Baking Co., 265 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 1972). The court interpreted
an alleged subrogation clause as, in effect, providing merely for reimbursement should the injured
person receive a recovery from the tortfeasor. The clause by its terms did not provide for any direct
action against the tortfeasor.
30. Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 Ohio St. 2d 43,43, 362 N.E. 2d 264,264-65 (1977) (quoting
from Mrs. Smith's policy with Travelers). Examples of the same or substantially similar wording
abound. See, e.g., Rinehart v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 115, 116,524 P.2d 1343, 1344
(1974); Bradford v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 8, 11,245 A.2d 478,479(1968).
31. Payment before suit would be required, however, even if not expressly provided for, before
subrogation could apply. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
32. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pohl, 255 Or. 46,48,464 P.2d 321,322 (1970) (emphasis
added). A substantially similar provision appeared in a policy that was the subject of litigation as
recently as 1976. Hart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 248 N.W.2d 881,883 (S.D. 1976). Whether
the specific language in the policy would allow the insurer to sue the tortfeasor directly m as not at issue
and was not discussed in the case.
33. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pohl. 255 Or. 46, 464 P.2d 321 (1970). The court
indicated its awareness of the contrary interpretation by the Supreme Court of Nevada.
34. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. CaUs. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 48 Ala. App. 172,263 So. 2d 149,
afftd, 263 So. 2d 155 (Ala. 1972).
35. 81 Nev. 361,404 P.2d l0(1965).
36. The majority emphasized that the tortfeasor had entered into a settlement with the injured
person in knowing disregard of the subrogation claim of the insurer, and thus could not use that
settlement as a bar to a subsequentsuit by the insurer against the tortfeasor. Allowing the insurer to sue
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The Oregon court's interpretation of the effect of this subrogation
provision seems preferable. Although legal subrogation against the tort-
feasor can arise independently of any contractual provision,37 when there
is a contract it ordinarily should control the nature and extent of the rights
of the parties who are in privity to it.38 Because the insurer drafted the
contractual provisions to claim an interest only in the proceeds of a
recovery, the insurer's own language should be read against it and enforced
accordingly.
III. THE EFFECT OF SUBROGATION ON
Two VENERABLE RULES OF TORT LITIGATION
A. The Common Law Prohibition Against Assigning a Cause of
Action for Personal Injury
Some recent cases have held that the subrogation of the automobile
insurer to the insured's claim for relief for medical payments is void
because it violates the common-law prohibition against assigning personal
injury claims.39 This prohibition of the common law is likely to be raised
in argument whenever a jurisdiction determines the applicability of
subrogation to personal injury torts as a matter of first impression.
Several reasons have traditionally been offered for the common-law
rule. There was some concern that allowing such assignments would
present a danger of champerty and maintenance,40 and would allow a
litigious person of wealth to harass the poor.41 In addition, the test of
assignability of claims at common law was whether the claim would
survive the death of its original holder. The cause of action for a personal
injury tort ended with the death of the person harmed and thus the claim
could not be assigned.42
Recent cases that have held subrogation for medical payments void as
violative of the common-law rule have not emphasized traditional ratio-
the tortfeasor was necessarily based on the concept that there were indeed subrogation rights
enforceable against the tortfeasor, arising either by contract or in equity, since otherwise there would
exist nothing capable of being knowingly disregarded.
37. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
38. G. COUCH, supra note 10, § 61:3; J. APPLEMAN, supra no.e 13, § 6503 and cases cited
therein.
39. See, e.g., State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Knapp, 107 Ariz. 184, 484 P.2d 180 (1971);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1965). For a statement of the common
law rule, see A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 857 (1952).
40. See Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 101 R.I. 708, 712, 227 A.2d 105, 109
(1967); Tyler v. Superior Court, 30 R.I. 107, 73 A. 467 (1909) (attorreys took assignment of their
client's favorable judgment for an assault, battery, and false imprisonment in place of their fees).
41. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500,508 (1955).
42. Cardington v. Administrator of Fredericks, 46 Ohio St. 442, 448, 21 N.E. 766, 768 (1889);
Slauson v. Schwabacher Bros., 4 Wash. 783, 784,31 P. 329,330 (1892); Annot., 40 A.LR.2d 500. 505
(1955). Many states, for example Ohio, have statutes that modify the common-law rule that causes of
action for personal injury will not survive the death of the injured party. SCeO1110oRv.Coti ANN.§
2305.21 (Page 1974).
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nales for the rule. Instead, these cases have focused upon the potential for
multiple litigation and the complication of settlements that would result if
subrogation were upheld.43 At least one modern case has held such
subrogation clauses void on the basis of statutory provisions that were
interpreted to incorporate the common-law rule."
The better reasoning accepted by many modern courts is that subro-
gation as it operates in current insurance practice is distinguishable from
assignment. Some technical distinctions between the two were asserted in
a recent Indiana case:
[S]ubrogation secures contribution and indemnity, whereas assignment
transfers the entire claim; the consideration in subrogation moves from
subrogor to subrogee, whereas in an assignment the consideration flows from
assignee to assignor; . . . assignment normally covers but a single claim,
whereas subrogation may include a number of claims over a specific period of
time; subrogation entails a substitution, whereas assignment is an outright
transfer.45
On a broader policy level, it can be seen that with subrogation, unlike
assignment, the danger is significantly lessened that a litigious meddler will
take advantage of the doctrine in order to gamble on the misery of another.
In subrogation theory the subrogated insurer, after being substituted to
the insured's claim for relief, seeks merely to be recompensed for the
amount he has already paid pursuant to the duty owed the insured under a
contract of indemnity. A volunteer who has no duty to indemnify the
injured person cannot claim the benefit of the doctrine,4 and even a proper
subrogee should not recover any more than the amount that the subrogee
has actually expended in payment for the injury.
B. The Effect of Subrogation on the Collateral Sources Rule
The collateral sources rule allows the victim of a tortious injury to
recover from both his insurer and the tortfeasor for the same harm,
assuming the harm was within the coverage of the injured person's policy.
There is a divergence of viewpoint regarding the fairness of the rule.
Some see the rule as allowing inequitable double recoveries, others feel
that it is justified as a means for ensuring adequate compensation to
43. See, e.g., State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Knapp, 107 Ariz. 184, 484 P.2d 180 (1971);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1965).
44. Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963).
45. Imel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 152 Ind. App. 75,78-79,281 N.E.2d 919,921 (1972). Other
cases that distinguish between subrogation and assignment include Hospital Serv. Corp. v.
Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 101 R.I. 708,713,227 A.2d 105, 109(1967); DeCespedes v. Prudence MuL Cas.
Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), aft'd, 202 So. 2d 561 (1967).
46. Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Co., 154 Kan. 643, 121 P.2d 193 (1942); J.
APPLEMAN, supra note 13, § 6502 n.22; E. PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 149; W. VANcEsupra note7, at
791.
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injured parties who are not able to directly recover for all the costs and
damages incurred incident to a tortious injury.47
To allow subrogation to tort claims diminishes the effect of the
collateral sources rule. When the insurer is subrogated, the insurer and
not the insured is the party entitled to recover for the subrogated item of
damage. Subrogation thus prevents a double recovery by the insured,
despite the collateral sources doctrine.48
The use of subrogation to prevent the collateral sources rule from
providing the insured with a double recovery arguably results in the insurer
receiving double compensation when it takes the premiums from the
insured to accept the risk, and then recovers its payment from the
wrongdoer when the risk comes home to rest. In response, it can be stated
that when the insurer has made provisions for subrogation the amount of
the premium reflects both the risk of negligent loss and potential offset of
some expenses through subrogation recoveries. This response is
undercut, however, if the premium charged to cover the risk is the same
with or without subrogation. In that case the insurer has received double
compensation.
Some information concerning the effect of subrogation on insurance
rates suggests that there is often not an equitable relationship between
subrogation recoveries and the cost of insuring a risk.5" When subroga-
tion has only an insignificant effect on rates, the insurer can nevertheless
argue that it has simply made a very good bargain and should receive the
benefit. The persuasiveness of this latter argument is diminished if one
considers insurance policies as contracts of adhesion; the insurer should
not be able to enforce "very good bargains" at the expense of the insured,
who by virtue of subrogation is precluded from receiving funds to which he
would otherwise be entitled under the collateral sources rule.
IV. JOINDER OF THE INSURER IN LITIGATION
The defendant tortfeasor can seek joinder of the subrogated insurer
when a lawsuit is filed by the injured party.5' With the expansion of
insurance subrogation into the area of personal injury torts, joinder
47. For an excellent discussion of the collateral sources rule, see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAtS, TIIL
LAW OF TORTS § 25.22 (1956).
48. Defeat of the collateral sources rule affects only the insured. From the tortfcasor's
perspective, there is no material change. The same amount that he would have paid to the inlured
insured will, under subrogation, be redirected to the insurer.
49. R. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTicu 25 (1964).
50. See text accompanying notes 68-73 infra. See also R. HORN, supra note 49, at 149 (rating
bureaus may not be required to provide subrogation recovery data in support of rate filings); Id. at 173
(many insurers refused to respond to a questionnaire concerning their ,.ubrogation practices). Thus
there may be some difficulty in obtaining specific information concerning the effects of subrogation
within a particular jurisdiction.
51. The defendant can, of course, also seek joinder of the injured party in a lawsuit filed by the
subrogated insurer. Royal Indem. Co. v. City of Erie, 326 F. Supp. 571 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
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becomes increasingly important because there is a greater likelihood that
more than one subrogated insured will be involved. Following an automo-
bile accident, for example, Travelers might be subrogated to the property
damage claim, Blue Cross and Blue Shield subrogated to various portions
of the claim for medical expenses, and the insured might possess a claim for
pain and suffering and lost wages. A failure to join may subject the
tortfeasor to separate suits by all these parties.5 2
To achieve joinder of a party, the courts of the forum state must be
able to exercise jurisdiction over that party. Due process requires that,
to be subject to the jurisdiction of courts within a state, a party "have
certain minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' ,53 Modern long-arm statutes typically include provisions sub-
jecting any corporation that transacts business within the state or
contracts to insure any person, property, or risk within the state to the
jurisdiction of that state's courts.54 A single insurance contract within
a state has been held constitutionally sufficient to subject the insurer to
the jurisdiction of that state's courts. 55
Joining the insurer has several advantages to the defendant tortfeasor
apart from avoiding subsequent separate suit by the insurer as subrogee.
Especially in jurisdictions that require the subrogated insurer to pursue its
claim in its own name as the real party in interest, counsel for the de-
fendant tortfeasors frequently seek to join as many insurers as possible.
As Dean Prosser has noted, "[t]he evidence given in personal injury cases
usually consists of highly contradictory statements from the two sides,
estimating such factors as time, speed, distance and visibility, offered
months after the event by witnesses who were never very sure just what
happened when they saw it . , In close cases, the prospect of
having the insurance company as a plaintiff against the individual may well
tip the balance in favor of the defendant in thejurors' minds, or at least lead
them to view the case as being in equipoise. In cases in which the insured is
covered by several policies with each insurer upon payment being subro-
gated by the terms of its policy, the alleged tortfeasor can, by joining all of
the insurance companies, create a very definite impression of the tortfeasor
David being pitted against the insurance Goliaths.
To avoid such possible juror bias, insurers in some jurisdictions have
used a device known as a loan receipt to avoid the impact of real party in
52. See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Steigerwalt, 21 Ohio St. 2d 87, 255 N.E.2d 570(1970); Hoosier
Cas. Co. v. Davis, 172 Ohio St. 5, 173 N.E.2d 349 (1961).
53. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945).
54. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 I0, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1955); Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.382
(Page Supp. 1977).
55. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
56. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF TnE LAW OF TORTS § 84, at 558 (4th ed. 1971).
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interest rules. 7 Insurers pay the insured as required by the policy, but call
the disbursement a loan. The document that the insured signs upon
receiving the money provides that the "loan" is to be repaid from the
proceeds of the recovery that the insured receives from the tortfeasor. 8
The insurer then claims that the insured, not itself, is the real party in
interest because the insurer has only lent money and has not made
payment. Some courts have been willing to look behind the fiction of the
loan receipt and require that the insurer sue in its own name as a subrogee
when payment that it is clearly obligated to make under the terms of its
policy is provided in the guise of a loan. 9
The applicable joinder rules vary among jurisdictions. The following
discussion of relevant Ohio law illustrates additional aspects ofjoinder in
insurance litigation.
In Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Steigerwalt,60 the Ohio Supreme
Court allowed an automobile insurer subrogated to a property damage
claim to sue the alleged tortfeasor even though the alleged tortfeasor had
won an earlier action prosecuted by the injured insured. The court
decided that the prohibition against splitting a cause of action and the
doctrine of res judicata were primarily for the benefit of the defendant. By
failing to seek joinder, the defendant had waived these defenses to multiple
litigation.61
The Steigerwalt rule can result in harsh consequences for a defendant
who does not join the insurer in the suit. The chance, however, of a
defendant being surprised by a second suit prosecuted by a subrogated
insurer is reduced by Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 19(C). Under Rule
19(C), an injured insured who sues the tortfeasor has an affirmative
obligation to name his subrogees in his pleading and state the reasons why
they are not joined as part of his suit. The tortfeasor will thereby have
actual notice of the outstanding claims when litigation occurs.
Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 19(A) directs that a subrogee subject to
service of process shall be joined as a party. If the subrogee has not been
joined, "the court shall order that [it] be made a party upon timely
assertion of the defense of failure to join a party. . . If the defense is not
timely asserted, waiver is applicable ... . When plaintiff insured has
violated Rule 19(C) by failing to disclose the names of the subrogees, it can
57. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 17; OHio R. Civ. P. 17. These Rules provide that "le]vcry action
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."
58. See R. KEETON, BASic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 156-57 (1971); E. PATTERSON, supra note 7,
at 149.
59. See, e.g., City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, 410 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cleveland Paint
and Color Co. v. Bauer Mfg. Co., 155 Ohio St. 17, 97 N.E.2d 545 (1951). Contra, Crocker v. New
England Power Co., 348 Mass. 159,202 N.E.2d 793 (1969).
60. 21 Ohio St. 2d 87, 255 N.E.2d 570(1970).
61. Id. at 87-88, 255 N.E.2d at 570(1970).
62. OHio R. Civ. P. 19(A).
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plausibly be argued that defendant tortfeasor who has not timely63 asserted
the defense of failure to join a necessary party should not be held to have
waived that defense. Waiver generally requires an express or implied
voluntary relinquishment of a known right, and the failure to comply with
Rule 19(C) prevents the defendant from knowing, during the pleading
stage, of the subrogees that should be joined. The tortfeasor should
therefore be able to raise the defense at a later time, for example, after
discovery is complete, if Rule 19(C) is not complied with. The defendant
should at least be provided an opportunity to inform himself of the
subrogation claims by use of interrogatories or depositions during
discovery before the defense of failure to join a necessary party is
precluded.
Often, the responsibility for seeing that joinder occurs falls on the
defendant, who by failing to fulfill that responsibility may leave himself
open to multiple litigation. Nevertheless, if the subrogated insurer is an
indispensable party and not merely a necessary one, the ultimate burden of
not joining it as a party may fall upon the insured plaintiff, whose action
may be dismissed if an indispensable party is notjoined." An insurer is an
indispensable party only if its presence in the suit is so important that "in
equity and good conscience" the litigation should not proceed without it.65
The indispensable party rule may seldom present a major problem to
an injured insured. Indeed, it would seemingly be a rare case in which a
court would deny redress to an injured insured simply because the
subrogee is not joined. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 66 has declared that in
federal practice insurers subrogated to only part of the claims that an
insured has against a tortfeasor are only necessary, not indispensable,
parties.67 Insurers of personal injuries seldom cover completely such
items as lost wages and pain and suffering, and thus are generally only
subrogees to a portion of the tort claims. Because the applicable
procedural rule in Ohio, Rule 19(B), is modeled after Federal Rule 19,
Aetna can be viewed as persuasive, although not mandatory, authority.
63. Id. See J. MCCORMAC, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE 61(1970). Seealso 013o R. Ct'. P.
12(B), which requires that plaintiff's failure to join a party under Rule 19 must be raised as a defense
either by motion "before pleading if a further pleading is permitted," or "in the responsive
pleading ... if one is required." The defendant generally has 28 days after plaintiff's service of
process before his answer is due. OHIO R. Civ. P. 12(A)(1).
64. OHIo R. Civ. p. 19(B) & 12(H). See J. McCoR.IAC, supra note 63, at 61.
65. OHIO R. Civ. P. 19(B). The Rule also lists some more specific criteria that arc to be
considered in determining whether the party is indispensable.
66. 338 U.S. 366(1949).
67. Id. at 382. Although the older version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 was the basis of
the Court's decision, the 1966 revision was not intended to change the principles of the Rule;, thus,
Aetna should continue to be valid. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390
U.S. 102, 117 (1968); 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES PAIPIHLET 516 (1975).
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V. POLICY ISSUES
A. Subrogation and Insurance Rates
Attorneys, seeking to impress courts with the equities of the situation,
will often discuss whether subrogation reduces insurance rates. Some
courts have accepted in a conclusory manner the argument that subroga-
tion will decrease insurance rates. Other courts have been skeptical
whether anticipated recoveries under subrogation provisions are translat-
ed into reductions in premiums. 69 Those who view skeptically the claims
of savings to the insurance industry, with correlative reductions in rates,
appear justified in th6ir doubts. For automobile insurance and other
areas in which both parties to an accident typically carry policies, subroga-
tion may only allocate financial responsibility between insurers with no
substantial savings to the industry as a whole.70 What occurs is often
tantamount to a transfer of funds between competing insurers.
This transfer, or its functional equivalent, can occur in at least three
ways. First, the injured party's insurer can pay the expenses incurred by
its insured incident to the accident and then b. reimbursed by the
tortfeasor's insurer.7" Second, the injured party's insurer, after making
payment under the policy provisions, can successfully sue its own insured
for reimbursement when the innocent insured receives a second recovery
from the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer. 2 The innocent insured is
thus merely a conduit through which money flows from the tortfeasor's
insurer to the innocent party's insurer. Last, the injured party's insurer
may have its subrogation rights prejudiced by the injured party's settle-
ment with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer prior to payment
being disbursed. The prejudicial settlement will create an effective defense
to an action brought by the injured party to compel payment by his own
insurer for the same expenses covered by the settlement with the tortfea-
sor.73  While no direct transfer between insurers has occurred in the last
transaction, the net effect can be viewed as equivalent to a transfer. The
injured party's insurer is able to keep money it otherwise would have had to
expend but for the settlement and payment by the tortfeasor's insurer.
68. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 245 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1976).
69. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Mo. App. 1965);
DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 227-28 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 1966), aff'd, 202
So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1967).
70. Insurers in other nations sometimes have "knock for knock" arrangements by which it is
agreed that subrogation claims will not be pursued when there is an insurance company on each side of
alawsuit. Antitrust laws impede adoption of such agreements within the United States, P.KtvTON
& R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 320 (1971).
71. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roark, 517 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1974),
72. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 218 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d 152 (1967);
Collins v. Blue Cross of Va., 213 Va. 540,193 S.E.2d 782 (1973); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Rader, 152 W.
Va. 699, 166 S.E.2d 157 (1969).
73. See, e.g., Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 Ohio St. 2d 43, 362 N.E.2d 264 (1977); Gcertz v,
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 253 Or. 307,451 P.2d 860 (1969).
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This transaction is analogous to direct reimbursement of the innocent
party's insurer by the tortfeasor's insurer.
There is also considerable doubt whether subrogation provisions
significantly determine the rates of individual insurers. The attorney
should be aware that even when an insurer has substantial recoveries or a
significant reduction in paid-out benefits because of subrogation, the
benefit to the insurer is not necessarily translated equitably into lower
premiums for the insurance customer. A study conducted in the early
1960's discovered that rating bureaus "do not . . . possess any informa-
tion on the precise dollar magnitudes of third-party recoveries under
subrogation, 74 and that some major insurers did not record subrogation
statistics by class of insurance.75 While neither fact taken from the study is
conclusive, each supports the view that there is not a fair relation between
subrogation recoveries and the cost of insuring a risk.
Professor Patterson has, for example, referred to subrogation as
providing a "windfall" to the insurer that does not significantly affect the
cost paid by the insurance customer.76 Other legal authorities have also
indicated in more restrained language that subrogation often plays an
insignificant role in computation of premium rates.77 In brief, as Profes-
sor Young has noted, "[i]nsurance subrogation would have more friends
than it does if it could be shown that recoveries enter into premium-rate
calculations in an equitable way. 78
B. Priority in Reviewing the Recovery From the Tortfeasor
After a judgment is rendered against the tortfeasor, the question can
arise whether the subrogated insurer or the insured should have priority
(that is, be paid first from the funds available from the tortfeasor).79
Priority becomes critical if the tortfeasor has assets so limited that he is
unable to pay the claims of both the insured and the subrogated insurer"0
or if payment is exacted from the tortfeasor over a long period of time
through serial executions. It may be critically important to an injured
74. R. HORN, supra note 49, at 151.
75. Id. at 174.
76. E. PATTERSoN,supra note 7, at 151-52.
77. See DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224,228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966),
affd, 202 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1967); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418,425 (Mo. App.
1965). See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JANIES, supra note 47, § 25.23 (1956). W. YOUNG. TiE LAW OF
INSURANCE 342-43 (1971); Reed, Insurance Subrogation in Personal Injury Actions: The Silent
Explosion 12 Am. Bus. L. J. Ii1, 120 (1975) ("Insurance companies, in most instances apparently.
apply subrogation recoveries to increase stockholder dividends rather than to reduce premiums.-)
78. W. YOUNcG, supra note 77, at 342.
79. See generally J. APPLEIMAN & J. APPLEMIA,, supra note 9, § 4096.
80. See, e.g., Ervin v. Garner, 25 Ohio St. 2d 231, 267 N.E.2d 769 (1971). It is possible that the
insurer and insured could enter into an agreement whereby each receives a proportional share of the
available recovery. The party entitled to be paid by receiving the first, and perhaps only, money
available from the tortfeasor may, however, often be unwilling to enter such an agreement since it can
reduce the size of his recovery.
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insured to recover promptly; the recovery may be the major source of
funds for the payment of accident-related expenses. To illustrate how the
law on priority can develop within a jurisdiction, relevant Ohio Supreme
Court cases will be reviewed.
Newcomb v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.81 is an early Ohio case adopt-
ing the principle that the insured is entitled to be compensated for both his
loss and for reasonable expenses incurred in seeking recovery before the
insurer can claim proceeds from the tortfeasor. The insurer in Newcomb
based its priority claim upon legal, not contractual, subrogation and thus
this decision of the Ohio Supreme Court represents a clear policy choice in
favor of the insured when there is no express term in the policy covering the
matter.
The decision in Newcomb represents sound reasoning. Insurers draft
subrogation provisions and are in a superior bargaining position. It is
thus reasonable to put the burden on the insurer to provide expressly for its
own priority if this right is desired and to allow the insured priority if the
contract is silent on this subject. This priority, however, should only last
until an amount equivalent to the loss not covered by insurance is paid.
Once the insured has received both the insurance money and an amount
equal to the loss not covered by the insurance, he has been adequately
compensated for the damage and the remaining funds available from the
tortfeasor should go directly to the subrogated insurer without first passing
through the hands of the insured.
Perhaps the strongest policy reason for allowing the insurer to have
priority in the absence of an express provision is the assertion that it will
increase the amounts recovered by insurers and lead to lower rates. It
seems somewhat doubtful, however, that a factor that the insurer has not
thought to include in its contract is equitably considered in the calculation
of its rates. Moreover, there is an equally valid counterbalancing policy
concern for potential hardship to the injured insured who, if not given
priority, must bear the entire brunt of the tortfeasor's lack of sufficient
funds. An insurer can spread the burden over a pool of policyholders.
Parties, however, retain their general freedom to contract and the
result in Newcomb can be altered by virtue of express contractual
provisions. Thus, in Peterson v. Ohio Farmers Insurance Co.82 the
syllabus of the Ohio Supreme Court states:8 3
Where the policy subrogation provision and the subrogation assignment to
the insurer convey all right of recovery against any third-party wrongdoer to
the extent of thd payment by the insurer to the insured, an insurer, who has
81. 22 Ohio St. 382 (1872).
82. 175 Ohio St. 34, 191 N.E.2d 157(1963).
83. In Ohio the syllabus statement is important since if there is a conflict between the opinion and
the syllabus regarding a statement of law, the syllabus will control. State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips,
168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
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cooperated and assisted in recovery from the wrongdoer, is entitled to be
indemnified first out of the proceeds of such recovery. '
Subsequently, in Ervin v. Garner,"s a case involving a subrogation
provision and after-loss agreement similar to that in Peterson, the Ohio
Supreme Court allowed the insurer to have priority despite the lack of
significant assistance by the insurer in the prosecution of the suit against
the tortfeasor
8 6
The critical language of the insurance policies in Peterson and Ervin
provided that in exchange for the insurance payment the insured would be
required to convey "all right of recovery against any party for loss to the
extent that payment therefor is made by this company."8 7 A passage in
Peterson, later quoted in Ervin, stated:
The insured's conveyance of all right of recovery up to a certain limit, viz., the
extent of the insurer's payment in settlement of the insured's claim, can mean
only that the assignee [subrogee] is the owner of all the insured's rights of
recovery until he is paid. The assignee [subrogee] ...must have priority in
payment out of the funds recovered.88
The language of the quoted subrogation provision did not, in this
writer's view, express the insurer's priority in a straightforward manner.
Indeed, neither the word "priority" nor the phrase "the insurer is to be
paid first" appears in the agreement. The conveyance of all claims to the
extent of the amount paid by the insurer can be reasonably interpreted as
merely an express allocation of the portion of the total claims that the
insurer could properly control as subrogee after payment; the language
need not affect priority at all. Because the insurer, as drafter of the
contract, should have the subrogation provision construed against it, more
explicit terms should be required to grant priority to the insurer. The
following language may be appropriate: The insurer, to the extent of its
payment to the insured for which it claims subrogation, is entitled to be
paid before the insured from any recovery available from the tortfeasor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because accident and health insurance is increasingly common and
because accidents involving personal injury often precipitate lawsuits or
threatened lawsuits, the attorney is likely to have occasion to consider the
84. Id. at 34, 191 N.E.2d at 157.
85. 25 Ohio St. 2d 231,267 N.E.2d 769 (1971).
86. Id. at 231,267 N.E.2d at 769-70. In Ervin the extent of the insurer's cooperation apparently
consisted of sending a letter that asked the insured's attorney to represent its interests also. The letter
containing the request was not answered by the insured's attorney. Peterson was distinguished on the
basis of this "cooperation."
87. Ervin v. Garner, 25 Ohio St. 2d 231,238,267 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1971); Peterson v. Ohio
Farmers Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 34,37, 191 N.E.2d 157,159 (1963).
88. Ervin v. Garner, 25 Ohio St. 2d 231, 237, 267 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1971); Peterson v. Ohio
Farmers Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 34, 37, 191 N.E.2d 157, 159 (1963).
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effects of insurance subrogation on personal injury torts. A distinction can
be drawn between subrogation and assignment and thus even states that
maintain the common-law prohibition against assigning a cause of action
for personal injury may enforce subrogation provisions.
When subrogation provisions are enforced, the collateral sources rule
has its benefits diminished from the viewpoint of the injured insured since
subrogation prevents double recoveries by the insured and thus reduces his
ultimate net recovery. Also, the prevalence of insurance means that more
than one insurer may be providing coverage for an individual. Thus, from
the viewpoint of the defending tortfeasor, the attempt should be made to
join as many insurers as possible in the lawsuit in order to avoid multiple
litigation and for tactical advantage when the insurer must pursue its claim
in its own name under the jurisdiction's real part) in interest rule.
Finally, subrogation recoveries have not generally been shown to
have an equitable relationship to premium rate calculations and there is a
question whether the insurer or the insured should recover first from the
proceeds provided by the tortfeasor. In the absence of an express and
straightforward provision granting priority to the insurer; the insured
should be the party who recovers first from the tortfeasor.
Donald J. Srail
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